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Radkey sets out a policy of less restrictive admission, approves the
law-fact distinction, and affirms the test applied thereto to be a differ-
entiation between legal definitions or conclusions and general mental
condition.
Ambiguity enters this criterion at the test level. Certainly the issue
of testamentary capacity may be developed either directly or indirect-
ly. It appears from Radkey that testimony may not include the
phrase "legal capacity" because this approaches the issue too directly.
The testimony may, however, involve the terms "mental capacity"
and "sound mind," when not appended to the phrase "to execute a
will," because this is an indirect approach. But the phrase "to execute
a will" may also be asked indirectly, thus creating another problem
area. No cases to date have tested the court's new criterion for admis-
sion.
The court at best has established a vague guideline. A possible alter-
native, which the court mentioned in a footnote"0 but dismissed be-
cause it did not follow prior Texas decisions, would have been better.
This alternative would permit admission of all testimony, and "any
difference of definition . . . [could] be brought out by proper cross
examination." 1 Use of this approach avoids dealing with both "the-
ories" and "tests." The only possible objection would be at the
"policy" level, and, under the less restrictive Radkey approach, "any
question and answer should be allowed if it would be helpful to the
jury."
Ion Roger Bauman
Potential Limitations Upon the Tenure of Federal Trial
Judges - Some Implications of the Chandler Case
While the United States district judge is basically independent
with extensive discretionary power and potential life tenure, the
development of an administrative process in recent years has posed a
latent threat to his independence. Conflict finally erupted when the
Tenth Circuit Judicial Council ordered that the Honorable Stephen
S. Chandler, Chief Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma, be
deprived of the power to adjudicate any presently pending or sub-




sequent cases.' The judge attacked the order in the United States
Supreme Court, where it was declared interlocutory.! Pursuant to
the Court's mandate, the Council granted the judge a hearing but sub-
sequently cancelled it and ordered that the judge's pending caseload
be restored.! The Council persistently refused to restore his power to
hear future cases. Judge Chandler has renewed his attack in the
United States Supreme Court, declaring as his purpose the defense of
the concept of judicial independence.4
Independence of the federal judiciary is one of the primary tenets
of the American constitutional system, developed in response to
abuses of power by the kings of England,' and incorporated in Article
III of the Constitution through the adoption of the Randolph Plan.'
The Constitution states that judges "both of the supreme and in-
ferior courts, shall hold their office during good behavior, and shall,
at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall
not be diminished during their continuance in office." 7
While the concept of an independent judiciary is fundamental in
the federal trial system, some degree of administrative supervision is
'Since 1961 the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler has been embroiled in four major con-
troversies. He has been disqualified in two separate actions: Occidental Petroleum v. Chand-
ler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963); and Texaco, Inc. v.
Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). Later he was
sued for alleged malicious prosecution, libel, and slander, but the case was dismissed, O'Bryan
v. Chandler, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 926 (1966). In an un-
related criminal case Judge Chandler was charged with conspiring to defraud the State of
Oklahoma, but the indictment was quashed by the state court in Oklahoma v. Chandler &
Kessler, No. 31299, D. Okla., Nov. 1965.
Citing these situations, and declaring that the judge was "presently unable, or unwilling,
to discharge efficiently the duties of his office," the Council
accordingly . . . ordered . . . that until the further order of the Judicial
Council, the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler shall take no action whatever in
any case or proceeding now or hereafter pending . . . ; that all cases and
proceedings now assigned to or pending before him shall be reassigned to and
among the other judges of said court; and that until the further order of the
Judicial Council no cases or proceedings . . . shall be assigned to him for any
action whatsoever.
'Chandler v. Judicial Council, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966). In his dissent Mr. Justice Black,
joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, declared that the order was not interlocutory because the
Council lacked the power to make even interlocutory orders which affected the continuance
in office of a district judge.
a Order of the Judicial Council, In the Matter of the Division of Business in the Western
District of Oklahoma, unpublished (February 4, 1966), on file in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and in the files of the Tenth Circuit.
4 Application for a Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus, renewed, February, 1966.
a "He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and
the amount and payment of their salaries." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; Judges
were "dependent on the Crown alone for their salaries." THE COLONIAL DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS (Oct. 14, 1774).
'WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 659 (1928).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The origin of this provision, according to Justice Field in
McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 194 (1891), lies in the statute of 13 Will. III,
ch. 2. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton).
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essential to its efficient operation. For example, the district judge is
greatly assisted by equitable caseload distribution and administrative
coordination. In addition to these basic areas, however, supervision
has been suggested as a potential tool to establish minimum stand-
ards of judicial conduct s To be effective, enforcement of these stand-
ards must be predicated upon the power to require conformity from
the recalcitrant judge, either by the threat of suspension or removal,
or by some less radical alternative.
I. CONTROL OF THE JUDICIARY
Threat of impeachment has heretofore been the only significant
restraint upon the independence of the judicial office, and it has often
been declared inadequate for supervisory use. Impeachment can be
cumbersome, overcast with political or partisian bias, costly, burdened
with a lack of investigative procedure and an overly large body of
judges, and only applicable to cases of misconduct.9 Because of these
inadequacies, other methods of removal and control of judges have
been proposed. These include devices such as enforced retirement at a
certain age0 (a proposal specifically rejected by the Constitutional
Convention) ," "substitution" of an additional judge by the Presi-
dent (using the heretofore dormant section 372 (b) of the Judicial
Code) ," and various methods of removal controlled by the judiciary
8 Lumbard, The Place of the Federal Judicial Councils in the Administration of the
Courts, 47 A.B.A.J. 169, 171 (1961). See also Frankel, Judicial Control and Removal, 44
TEXAS L. REv. 1117 (1966) (state removal plans).
9Frankel, Removal of Judges-Federal and State, 48 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 177, 180-81
(1965); Moore, Judicial Trial and Removal of Federal Judges, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 352
(1942); Potts, Impeachment as a Remedy, 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 15, 31 (1927); Shartel,
Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal--Some Possibilities Under the Con-
stitution, 28 MICH. L. REv. 870, 871 (1930); Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA.
L. REv. 651, 825 (1916).
'"This proposal has been introduced in Congress: S.B. 2299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
The basic arguments behind this type of plan are discussed in Fairman, The Retirement of
Federal Judges, 51 HARV. L. REv. 397, 433; and Major, Why Not Mandatory Retirement
for Federal Judges?, 52 A.B.A.J. 29 (1966). Such a provision is included in the Model State
Judicial Article, § 6, para. 2, 47 AM. JUD. Soc'v 10-11 (1963).
"THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Hamilton).
1228 U.S.C. § 372(b) provides:
Whenever any judge of the United States appointed to hold office during good
behavior who is eligible to retire under this section does not do so and a cer-
tificate of his disability signed by a majority of the members of the Judicial
Council of his circuit . . . is presented to the President, and the President
finds that such judge is unable to discharge efficiently all the duties of his
office by reason of permanent mental or physical disability and that the ap-
pointment of an additional judge is necessary for the efficient dispatch of
business, the President may make such appointment by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate ... "
H.R. 10117, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), contains a similar, but more extensive, pro-
vision. These provisions are, of course, surprisingly similar to those advanced by President
Roosevelt in regard to Justices of the Supreme Court.
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itself. 3 The latter approach, removal by judicial action, has been de-
fended as impartial, expedient, inherently judicial in nature, and
justified by the doctrine of separation of powers. " Several plans
involving judicial action propose an independent tribunal of judges
summoned either by Congress or the Supreme Court, or meeting sua
sponte, to determine the fitness of a judge." Coordination of such an
autonomous group with the judicial system presents a difficult task,
and perhaps for the sake of efficiency other proposals suggest adding
this function to the powers of some group now existing within the
system.'
II. THE JUDICIAL COUNCILS
Federal Judicial Councils have been suggested to exercise super-
visory power over federal judges. Composed of the circuit judges of
individual circuits, they presently consider the quarterly reports of
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and are empowered to make "all necessary orders for the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within
its circuit."'" Normally the councils have functioned in the field of
judicial administration, i.e., in dispatching, organizing, distributing,
and generally providing the mechanical supervision of the workload
of the district courts. 9 However, the Judicial Conference of the
United States recently noted a broader function which it considered
included within the powers and responsibilities of the councils. The
Conference termed this "the business of the judiciary in its institu-
tional sense (administration of justice), such as the avoiding of any
stigma, disrepute, or other element of loss of public esteem and con-
fidence in respect to the court system, from the actions of a judge
or other person attached to the courts."'
It seems that the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council determined this
broader function to be appropriate in the Chandler situation. As sta-
'" Allard, Judicial Discipline ajid Removal Plans, a Survey and Comparative Study, 48
J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 173 (1965); Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Re-
moval-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870-71 (1930).
'4 Shartel, supra note 13, at 876.
"Allard, supra note 13, at 173; Shartel, supra note 13, at 878; Retirement or Super-
session of Federal Judges, $ CONST. Ruv. 242-43 (1921); and see the discussion of the
McAdoo Bill in Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution,
51 HARV. L. REv. 330, 333-34 (1937).
" Judicial Conference of the United States, Report on the Powers and Responsibilities
of the Judicial Councils, H.R. Doc. No. 201, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1961).
" Lumbard, supra note 8, at 171.
's28 U.S.C. § 332.
19 House Comm. on the Judiciary, Membership of District judges on judicial Councils,
S. REP. No. 263, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
o Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 16, at 9.
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tutory authorization for its first order, the Council referred to section
332 of the Judicial Code;21 subsequently it also referred to section
137." By referring to these provisions, the Council impliedly ad-
vanced the argument that its action was purely administrative in
nature. The Council's administrative powers, as provided by these
statutes, are broad indeed. The question is whether Congress intended
for the councils to have the power to deprive a judge of his caseload,
and, if so, whether Congress may authorize this exercise of power in
view of the constitutional independence of the trial judge.
The legislative history of section 332 of the Judicial Code indicates
that the purpose of Congress was to create an administrative body
with extensive responsibilities." Congress included the provision for
the judicial councils in the Administrative Office Act of 1939, which
set up the Office of Judicial Administration." The primary purpose
of the act was to take the judicial budget out of the hands of the
Attorney-General's office and place it in the hands of the judiciary."
After minor amendments in 1948 and 1963, the provision relating to
the judicial councils reads as follows:
The chief judge of each circuit shall call .. .a council of the circuit
judges for the circuit....
The chief judge shall submit to the council the quarterly reports of
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
The council shall take such action thereon as may be necessary.
Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its
circuit. The district judges shall promptly carry into effect all orders of
the judicial council.2
"s Order of the Judicial Council, In the Matter of the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler,
United States District judge for the Western District of Oklahoma, unpublished (Decem-
ber 13, 1965), on file in the United States District Court for the Western District of Okla-
homa and in the files of the Tenth Circuit.
" Order of the Judicial Council, In the Matter of the Division of Business in the Western
District of Oklahoma, unpublished (Feb. 4, 1966), on file in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma and in the files of the Tenth Circuit.
' The bill was entitled, "A bill to provide for the administration of the United States
courts, and for other purposes." 84 CONG. REc. 9308 (1939). Parker, The Federal Judicial
System, 14 F.R.D. 361, 369, points out that there were four purposes of the act: (1) to
make the judiciary financially independent of the executive; (2) to create an agency to
prepare the judicial budget and submit written reports to the Judicial Conference of the
United States; (3) to set up the Judicial Councils in each circuit; (4) to require a confer-
ence of all district and circuit judges within each circuit each year.
484 CONG. REC. 10316, 10387 (1939).
as 84 CONG. REc. 9308 (1939). While the former system had worked well in practice,
its potential defects were obvious. See 22 F.R.D. 71, 75 n.5.
26 28 U.S.C. § 332. In the original act the section was numbered § 306, and read "To
the end that the work of the district courts shall be effectively and expeditiously transacted,
it shall be the duty of the senior circuit judge of each circuit to call . . . a council com-
posed of the circuit judges for such circuit, who are hereby designated a council for that
purpose .... It shall be the duty of the district judges promptly to carry out the directions




In the hearings on the original act, Senate Bill 188, before a sub-
committee of the Judiciary Committee, Chief Judge Harold Stephens
stated that "the judicial councils of the several circuits [have the]
... power to direct the activities of district judges, so far as efficiency
is concerned." 7 In a recent article Judge Prettyman, Chief Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, stated that "the statute is flat and unequivocal in conferring
power."2 Mr. Justice Brennan has noted that the councils have a
"broad authority and a significant responsibility." '29
Power is conferred upon the councils for the purpose of "effective
and expeditious administration." Although this language is broad and
somewhat indefinite, caseload distribution has been one of the coun-
cils' primary functions. Section 137 of the Judicial Code specifically
confers this power on the councils in certain instances: "If the dis-
trict judges in any district are unable to agree upon the [division of
business] . . . the judicial council of the circuit shall make the nec-
essary orders.""m
Because the councils were created as administrative bodies, statutory
authorization for actions like that of the Tenth Circuit in Chandler
must turn on whether they are purely administrative in nature. 1 The
only formal action involved in Chandler was caseload distribution,
normally purely administrative. Were a judge completely incapaci-
tated, the councils would have the power to delegate his cases to other
judges of the district. It is an easy analogy from this situation to that
of Chandler-to maintain that the Council acted where a district
judge was prevented from properly fulfilling his judicial function
because of some disability. On the other hand, there is no clear answer
as to whether a council would be authorized to re-distribute the case-
load of an incapacitated judge against his wishes; moreover, in Chand-
ler it appears that the Council's "administrative" action was preceded
by a judicial determination of the judge's suitability for office." The
fact that the Council restored the judge's pending cases indicates that
27 Hearings on S. 188 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 76 Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1939).
'.Prettyman, The Duties of a Circuit Chief Judge, 46 A.B.A.J. 633, 634 (1960).
"'Brennan, The Continuing Education of the Judiciary in Improved Procedures, 28
F.R.D. 42, 43 (1962).
328 U.S.C. § 137.
" Since administrative and judicial proceedings often involve substantially the same is-
sues, the distinction between administrative and judicial actions is normally predicated upon
the power of enforcement. A judicial body has the power to enforce its decisions; while
an administrative body must submit its action to judicial scrutiny before sanctions can be
applied. See Jaffe, The Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Orders, 76 HARV. L. REv.
865, 865-70 (1963). The distinction is not completely valid in Chandler because the mem-
bers of the Judicial Council were also the judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
aa See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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judicial ability was not the entire criterion for its decision. Clearly
the purpose of this action was to remove a United States district
judge, and its propriety hinges on whether form or substance is to be
controlling. While the councils are composed of judges, they are not
authorized by statute to decide cases or controversies within the mean-
ing of article III. If the Judicial Council in Chandler was deciding a
"controversy" within the meaning of the constitutional provision, its
action was judicial, and it had exceeded its statutory powers.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Impeachment
Assuming that the Council's action in regard to Judge Chandler
can be classified as administrative and is authorized by statute, it is
necessary to determine if Congress has the constitutional power to
authorize such action. The only removal device expressly mentioned
by the Constitution is impeachment, and no other method has ever
been used to remove or suspend federal judges." However, the Con-
stitution does not specify that impeachment is to be the exclusive
remedy, and, therefore, while some authorities merely assume this to
be settled in the affirmative,' others would suggest that removal by
other means might be accomplished within the existing constitutional
framework.' Those who suggest that the remedy is not exclusive point
out that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution one form of
the writ of scire facias emanated from the Court of King's Bench to
remove officers holding letters patent from the king." As the framers
were learned in the law, there is no reason to suspect that they were
unfamiliar with these proceedings nor that they sought to abolish
them. This reasoning is buttressed by the fact that while impeach-
ment is the sole removal device mentioned in the Constitution, non-
judicial officers have been removed by other means."7 Furthermore,
' United States territorial judges, however, have been held subject to executive removal,
as their office is not constitutional in origin. McAlister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174
(1891). Also, judges of United States constitutional courts have been effectively barred
from taking office. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Nine
federal judges have been impeached: John Pickering (1804); Samuel Chase (1805); James
H. Peck (1831); West H. Humphreys (1862); Charles Swayne (1905); Robert Archbald
(1913); George W. English (1926); Harold Louderback (1933); H. L. Ritter (1936).
There have been no impeachment proceedings in the last thirty years. The relevant consti-
tutional provisions are in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cls. 6, 7; art. II, § 4.
34 Fairman, supra note 10, at 334-36; 51 HARv. L. REv. 330, 334-36 (1937).
'See articles cited supra note 9.
"Note, The Exclusiveness of the Impeachment Power Under the Constitution, 51
HARv. L. REv. 330, 335, n. 36. But cf. McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 196
(1891) (Field, J., dissenting).
"SMyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1925). But cf. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United
States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The removal of executive officials has presented many prob-
lems, all of which are not yet solved.
NOTES1966]
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since judges hold office "during good behavior," when they cease to
act in this manner the office is forfeited, and removal by any means
may be an implementation of an implied constitutional directive."
On the other hand, many authorities assume that a constitutional
amendment would be required to implement removal by means other
than impeachment." They argue that the tenure of judges is fixed
by the Constitution, unlike that of other, admittedly removable,
civil officers.' Clearly the framers of the Constitution, themselves
fearing the evils of a controlled judiciary, intended that the federal
trial judge be independent. 1 In contrast, the removal of other civil
officeholders has been based in large measure on implied grants to
the executive from other provisions of the Constitution.' As Mr.
Justice Brandeis once noted, "the power to remove [a non-judicial
official] is . . . an incident to the power to appoint."' The fact that
impeachment has traditionally been considered exclusive for the
removal of judges lends additional support to this argument. More-
over, after the Act of Settlement," scire facias was never used in Eng-
land to remove officials whose tenure was for "good behavior."
B. Standards And Safeguards
If Congress has the authority to grant the power to remove or sus-
pend district judges, standards for the exercise of this power must be
predicated upon the good behavior provision of article III. Determina-
tion of the meaning of this standard, however, has created many
issues for resolution in previous impeachment trials: whether this in-
cludes only indictable offenses;' what relationship such actions must
have to the judicial office ;4' and whether judicial ability is a measur-
able criterion." If removal or suspension power is read into section 3 3 2
of the Judicial Code," this difficulty in the implementation of appro-
priate standards is augmented by the lack of express statutory guide
as Frankel, supra note 9. Judge Frankel suggests that the good behavior clause, coupled
with the necessary and proper clause, would justify removal. This argument provides a
justification for mandatory removal of a judge whose conduct clearly places him beyond
the constitutional protection. It is submitted, however, that it does not provide any guide
for the real question, viz., whether he may be subjected to judgment in the first place.
' See note 34 supra.
4 51 HARv. L. REV. 330, 335 (1937).4 1 See notes 5, 6, supra and accompanying text.
"s Executive removal is often justified by the use of article II.
"Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920).
" 13 Will. 3 (1701).
"See supra note 36.
"Simpson, Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 651, 682-83 (1916); Potts, Iun-
peach ment as a Remedy, 12 ST. Louis L. REV. 15, 31 (1927).
47 Simpson, supra note 46.
48 Ibid.
49 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
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and confused by the dual standard of "effective and expeditious
administration" and "good behavior."
The application of any standard necessarily involves significant
problems of due process. If the proceeding is judicial, of course the
normal trial safeguards must be accorded. Moreover, although in
authorizing administrative proceedings Congress may abridge the less
fundamental trial procedures, e.g., confrontation and cross-examina-
tion,' it is the announced policy of the Supreme Court to read all
trial procedures into a statute unless the less fundamental are spe-
cifically abridged by Congress." At a minimum, if the Judicial Coun-
cil's action is deemed administrative, it must accord with the prior
administrative removal cases which in some measure define the re-
quirements of due process in this type of proceeding." In Chandler,
however, the action of the Council occurred in secret session, where
the judge under consideration was neither present nor represented."
IV. CONCLUSION
The disadvantages of the present system of judicial tenure are
obvious-as where a once-excellent judge become senile or physically
disabled, yet remains to burden the adjudicative process. Because the
Supreme Court has as yet provided no definitive answer to the ques-
tions raised by this problem, ultimate resolution must remain in
abeyance. However, the following conclusions seem justified with re-
gard to the issue as it now exists.
First: Exclusion from participation in the adjudicative process is an
effective removal of a district judge from office. The fact that judges
would be allowed to retain the emoluments and accoutrements of
office is immaterial. Second: Congress did not authorize the removal
or suspension of district judges by sections 332 or 137. The purpose
of the act as revealed by the legislative history, its lack of a sufficient
standard, and its use for twenty-five years, leads to this conclusion.
Third: Congress does not have the constitutional authority to grant
its removal power to another body. Fourth: No removal of federal
judges can be justified which does not provide the fundamental trial
safeguards of either administrative or judicial proceedings, as the
Judicial Council in Chandler failed to do.
W. Richard Jones
50 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
" Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). But cf. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918
(1951), affirming 182 F.2d 46 (1950).
52 Ibid.
' The only persons present at this meeting were Judges Pickett, Breitenstein, Hill, and
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